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NEW YORKERS HAVE GOT IT RIGHT: A CALL
FOR A UNIFORM STANDARD TO COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital technology has established a new paradigm for easy access to
ideas. As a result, copyright law should be reexamined and further
clarified so an infringer cannot unlawfully appropriate protected
expressions of ideas without legal consequences. On the other hand, the
law should be crafted to encourage proliferation of and investment in
creative expression.
Currently, the Second and Ninth Circuits-the two major copyright
courts-are sharply divided on how to approach a copyright infringement
claim.2 When compared to the Second Circuit's approach, the Ninth
Circuit's copyright infringement test unduly complicates the process by not
"bother[ing] to first determine [whether] the accused text was derived from
the plaintiffs [work]."3 Conversely, the Second Circuit's test permits the
trier of fact to first determine whether the accused infringer's work derived
protected elements from the plaintiffs work, "separate from the far more
tedious and complicated task of determining whether what was borrowed
qualifies for protection by copyright."4  Other circuits are seemingly
"unaware of this fissure, as evidenced by the fact that several of them apply
both tests interchangeably.", 5 By consensus, the Ninth Circuit's approach is
"a complicated, time-consuming, multi-pronged test, containing vague and
1. See Douglas Y'Barbo, The Origin of the Contemporary Standard for Copyright
Infringement, 6 J. Intell. Prop. L. 285 (1999) ("Literature, film, music, sculpture, architecture, and
software all rely primarily upon federal copyright law for protection against unauthorized
copying, which if left unrestrained, would unquestionably squelch the incentive to create or to
invest in such creation.").
2. See id.
3. Id. at 313.
4. Id. at 314.
5. Id. at 285.
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redundant nomenclature...."
6
This Comment examines the critical issue of whether courts should
consider adopting a uniform approach to copyright infringement, thereby
safeguarding the expression of ideas and promoting the advancement of
creativity. Part II presents a general overview and reviews the
development of copyright law. Part III investigates case law in both the
Ninth and Second Circuits, because major copyright issues have
traditionally been-and will likely continue to be-debated and decided
primarily in these two courts.7  Part IV critiques the current state of
copyright infringement analysis. Finally, this Comment urges courts to
adopt a uniform copyright infringement standard based upon a formulation
by the Second Circuit. The standard should include a final filtration step to
separate works with a narrow range of protectable elements from works
with a wide range.
The new standard should clarify-in clear language and with a
defined procedural structure-the approach a court should take when
analyzing a copyright infringement claim. First, such an approach should
require proof of ownership of a valid copyright. Second, the plaintiff
should prove that the defendant actually copied protected elements of the
plaintiffs work. This should be an objective analysis proven by both
access and similarities probative of copying. The purpose of this objective
analysis is to distinguish between protected and unprotected elements.
Third, works with a narrow range of protectable expression should be
divided from works with a wide range, using an additional filtration
mechanism.8  This separation should establish whether the test for
determining subjective misappropriation is virtual identity or substantial
similarity. "When the range of protectable and unauthorized expression is
narrow, the appropriate standard for illicit copying is virtual identity." 9 On
the other hand, if the range of protectable elements is wide, then the court
6. Id.
7. Y'Barbo, supra note 1.
8. For further discussion, see generally Jeannette Rene Busek, Copyright Infringement: A
Proposal for a New Standard for Substantial Similarity Based on the Degree of Possible
Expressive Variation, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1777, 1802-03 (1998) (arguing that "the degree of
possible variation of expression is the driving factor in determining substantial similarity." As
such, "courts would be better off... articulating their decisions based on the amount of
expressive variation available to a particular type of work."). However, this Comment advocates
an initial division of a claim into two categories, a narrow range of protectable expression and a
broad range of protectable expression of protectable ideas. For further explication on this
proposal, see the discussion in Part IV of this Comment.
9. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
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should apply the "ordinary reasonable observer" test to determine whether
the defendant's work is substantially similar to the protectable elements of
the plaintiff s work.'0 An affirmative answer to either test would constitute
improper appropriation. Lastly, the court should apply any pertinent
limiting doctrines. This approach ensures that highly similar ideas (which
the law does not protect) are quickly distinguished from highly similar
expressions of ideas (which are protected) before the court must make the
difficult determination of whether actual copying of protected expressions
amounts to improper appropriation.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
A. Framework of a Copyright Infringement Action
The Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power...
[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings .... 11 Such writings are protected under the United
States Code as "original works of authorship,"' 2 which the Code defines as
literary, musical, dramatic, motion pictures and other audiovisual works,
sound recordings, and other particular types of intellectual creations. 13 In
contrast, copyright law does not protect any "idea, procedure, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work."
14
The underlying rationale for copyright protection is to protect "the
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors."'15 Stated
differently, the immediate reward of copyright protection serves as "a fair
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.'
16
10. Id. at 1442 (describing this general copyright test).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
13. See id.
14. Id. at § 102(b).
15.4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A]
(Matthew Bender & Co. 2006) (quoting New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 519 (2001)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
16. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (emphasis added).
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Thus, the Copyright Act recognizes, through its fair use doctrine, the value
inherent in public access to creative endeavors for purposes such as
education or criticism. 17
With the long-term purpose of copyright protection in mind,
copyright law should not become overprotective of creative works. Doing
so would render copyright law useless and leave little in the public sphere.
Moreover, an originator would likely lose incentive to create, since such a
strict standard would nearly eliminate any practical way to avoid infringing
on another's creative labor.
B. Prima Facie Case of Copyright Infringement
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,' 8 the
United States Supreme Court held that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case of copyright infringement by showing "(1) ownership of a valid
copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original." 19 Thus, copyright protection can only extend to original elements
of an author's work: "[o]riginality remains the sine qua non of
copyright.... ,,20
In Feist, the defendant admitted to copying names and telephone
numbers from the plaintiffs white pages telephone directory. E1 Despite the
defendant's admission to copying, the Court held that while factual
compilations may be protected, each factual element-in this case, each
name and telephone number-cannot be protected because each constitutes
a fact that can be freely discovered.2 2
Therefore, "a plaintiff [claiming copyright infringement] must first
show that his work was actually copied... [and] then must show that the
copying amounts to an improper or unlawful appropriation.' ' 23 "[A]lthough
the Second and Ninth Circuits currently apply different standards for
copyright infringement, the two circuits actually applied the same test
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work.., for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching... scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright.").
18. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
19. Id. at 361.
20. Id. at 348.
21. See id. at 361.
22. See id. at 348 ("Others may copy the underlying facts from the publication, but not the
precise words used to present them.").
23. Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 288 (citations omitted).
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many years ago."24  How the two circuits apply the actual copying and
improper appropriation requirements articulated in Feist will be examined
below.
III. COMPARE AND CONTRAST: THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPROACH VERSUS
THE SECOND CIRCUIT APPROACH
A. The Second Circuit Approach
The Second Circuit's approach to copyright infringement analysis
consists of three essential elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; (2)
evidence of actual copying as proven by (i) access and (ii) probative
similarity that substantiates actual copying of protectable elements; and (3)
substantial similarity as determined by the ordinary observer (improper
appropriation).25
This framework for analyzing copyright infringement claims is based
on the Second Circuit's 1946 decision in Arnstein v. Porter.26 The Arnstein
test provides that "[c]opyright infringement is established when the owner
of a valid copyright demonstrates unauthorized copying." 27 To determine
unauthorized copying with the Arnstein test, the trier of fact may rely on
28objective evidence, including dissection or expert testimony. Next, the
trier of fact must answer the key subjective question of what constitutes
substantial similarity. 29 For example, substantial similarity was found in a
contested musical composition when "defendant took from plaintiffs
works so much of what is pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who
comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed. 30  If
copying is established, then the issue of improper appropriation arises.3 1 In
24. Id. at 286.
25. See id. at 291. Professor Y'Barbo argues that there are essentially four elements to the
Second Circuit's copyright infringement analysis: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; (2) access;
(3) "similarity that is probative of derivation"; and (4) substantial similarity under the ordinary
observer test. This Comment disagrees with breaking the Second Circuit's test into four elements
since steps two and three (access and probative similarity) constitute actual copying.
26. See Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at
287 n.8.
27. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc. 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997)).
28. See Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
29. See id. at 473.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 468.
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this final element, the trier of fact may not rely on objective evidence to
determine whether improper appropriation of protected elements occurred
in violation of copyright law.32
1. Ownership of a Valid Copyright
The Copyright Act of 1976 gives an illustrative list of the works that
may be protected by copyright law.33 Generally, a plaintiff makes a prima
facie showing of a valid copyright ownership with a copyright registration
certificate.34
2. Actual Copying Proven by Access Plus "Probative Similarity"
35
After proving ownership of a valid copyright, a plaintiff must show
the defendant "actually copied' his or her work.36 A distinguishing factor
between the actual copying prong and the improper appropriation prong
lies in the use of expert testimony; expert testimony may be used to prove
actual copying.37 In contrast, expert testimony may not be used to prove
32. See id.
33. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). Protected works of authorship include literary works,
musical works, dramatic works, choreographic works, motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, among others.
34. See id. § 410(c). ("In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made
before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence
of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. The evidentiary weight to
be accorded the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the
court.").
35. See generally Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward
Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1187 (1990). The
Columbia Law Review published Professor Latman's article six years after his untimely death.
Professor Latman's professional colleagues and close friends knew of his attempts to complete
his study of copyright infringement in the last year of his life and found his unfinished manuscript
after his death in 1984. The article's text was nearly complete, though without footnotes.
Therefore, using their knowledge of Professor Latman's favorite cases and other leading
authorities' works, his colleagues constructed and added the footnotes, assisted by the staff of the
Columbia Law Review. There was no substantive modification to Professor Latman's analysis
(minimally supplemented with post-1984 developments). This article not only clarifies the
elements that must be proven to claim copyright infringement, but also urges courts to adopt the
term "probative similarity" in the copyright infringement dictionary.
36. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc. 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1992)) (emphasis
added).
37. See id. ("[A]ctual copying may be established 'either by direct evidence of copying or
by indirect evidence ... ' (quoting Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir.
1992))).
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"improper appropriation.
'" 38
A plaintiff can prove the actual copying requirement either by direct
or circumstantial evidence whereby the trier of fact can reasonably infer
copying.39 In copyright infringement claims, "collaborators, coworkers and
others who have in fact observed the producer of defendant's material at
work" could provide direct evidence. 40  Alternatively, "situation[s] in
which defendant's 'author' had earlier studied or worked with plaintiffs
material in the course of aborted negotiations" could be another source of
express proof of actual copying.4'
If direct evidence of copying is unavailable, a plaintiff can prove
actual copying with indirect evidence by showing the defendant had access
to the plaintiffs work and by proving probative similarity between the two
works.42 To show "access," evidence will generally be circumstantial,43
based on general knowledge,44 or a sequence of events.45  Essentially,
"courts have been satisfied with a showing that the defendant had a
'reasonable opportunity to view' the original work." Even the plaintiff
who provides clear and convincing evidence of access must then prove
"probative similarity. ' 4 7
A similarity is probative of copying if, "it is one that under all the
circumstances justifies an inference of copying."'48 The late Professor Alan
Latman, who coined the term "probative similarity" and urged courts to
adopt it,4 9 emphasized "that proof of copying may have nothing to do with
the substantiality of the protected material taken." 50  For instance, it is
possible that a plaintiffs unique expression of an idea embodied in a
38. Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 290.
39. See Latman, supra note 35, at 1192 (quoting Amstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d
Cir. 1946)).
40. Id. at 1194.
41. Id.
42. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990).
43. See, e.g., Toksvig v. Bruce Publ'g Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
44. See, e.g., ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1991).
45. See, e.g., Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939 (8th Cir. 1992).
46. Busek, supra note 8, at 1786 (citing 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.02(A) (1997) (citations omitted)).
47. See id. (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977) (Ninth Circuit court held that clear evidence of access-that
defendants had visited the plaintiff's headquarters to discuss "engineering and design work"-
justified a lower degree of similarity)).
48. Latman, supra note 35, at 1190.
49. See id. at 1187.
50. Id. at 1206.
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sculpture of a thumbnail could be protected under copyright law.51 "In one
instance of applied art involving 'GI Joe,' a somewhat realistic doll of a
male military figure with ... a small anatomical error was emphasized by
the court to establish copying., 52 Like the defendant's doll, "[t]he right
thumbnail of plaintiffs fighting figure was misplaced, i.e., it was on the
side, rather than the back, of the end of the thumb. 53 As Professor Latman
argued, consumers did not purchase plaintiff's "GI Joe" doll "because of its
right [misplaced] thumbnail. '54  However, the similarity between a
plaintiffs mere idea and the accused infringer's idea of a sculpture of a
thumbnail cannot be considered "substantial. 55
Another purpose of using the term "probative similarity" is to
emphasize that there may be facts other than similarity that are probative of
copying. 6 A common scenario occurs when a defendant heard or saw a
plaintiffs work and essentially decided to use it as a model. 7 In Thomas
Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfinan Co., the court found a clear example of
this scenario.58 There, a customer gave a sample of plaintiffs lace fabric
embodying a copyrighted design to the defendant's vice president and
suggested that the "defendant produce a lace 'which would have the look'
of plaintiffs design." 59 The court held that there was "clear evidence of
copying.
60
3. Ordinary Observer Standard to Determine "Substantial Similarity"
Once the court determines actual copying by access and probative
similarity, a plaintiff must then prove that such copying amounted to
unlawful or improper appropriation.61 In order to determine whether works
51. See id.
52. Id. at 1205 (citing Hassenfield Bros. v. Mego Corp., 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 786
(S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
53. Id. (citing Hassenfield Bros., 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 788).
54. See Latman, supra note 35, at 1206.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 1207 (citing Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409,
410 (2d Cir. 1970); Iris Arc v. S.S. Sama, Inc., 6221 F. Supp. 916, 923 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
58. Thomas Wilson & Co., 433 F.2d at 415.
59. Latman, supra note 35, at 1208 (quoting Thomas Wilson & Co., 433 F.2d at 410
(internal quotations omitted)).
60. Thomas Wilson & Co., 433 F.2d at 415.
61. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2004)
(stating that "Mattel's copyright in a doll visage with an upturned nose, bow lips, and widely
spaced eyes will not prevent a competitor from making dolls with upturned noses, bow lips, and
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by the plaintiff and the defendant are "substantially similar," the Second
Circuit uses the "ordinary observer" standard and asks whether "the
ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the disparities, would be
disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the same.
', 62
i. Learned Hand's Abstractions Test
"In 1930, Judge Learned Hand made one of the earliest attempts at
defining the meaning of substantial similarity. 63 The case of Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp.64 concerned a motion picture and a play with a
similar theme involving an Irish family and a Jewish family whose children
married one another.65 The court held that the copying of the underlying
premise was not unlawful, and Judge Hand explained that "[u]pon any
work ... a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally
well, as more and more of the incident is left out. ' 6 6 While the first pattern
may be virtually exact copying, "[t]he last may perhaps be no more than
the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might
consist only of its title. ... ,,67 Judge Hand further explained "there is a
point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which,
apart from their expression, his property is never extended.,
68
The fact finder must then decide whether the defendant's copying is
an unlawful appropriation so as to establish copyright infringement.69 In
essence, Judge Hand's abstractions test is merely "a restatement of the
idea/expression dichotomy that a trier of fact must bear in mind when
conducting the analysis."
70
widely spaced eyes, even if the competitor has taken the idea from Mattel's example, so long as
the competitor has not copied Mattel's particularized expression").
62. Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Califomia, 937 F.2d 759, 765 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960)).
63. See Busek, supra note 8, at 1788 (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119 (2d Cir. 1930)).
64. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 119.
65. See Busek, supra note 8, at 1788 (citing Nichols, 45 F.2d at 120).
66. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Jarrod M. Mohler, Toward A Better Understanding of Substantial Similarity in
Copyright Infringement Cases, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 971, 982 (2000) (citing Aaron M. Broaddus,
Eliminating the Confusion: A Restatement of the Test for Copyright Infringement, 5 DEPAUL-
LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POLICY 43, 56 (1994-95)).
70. Id. (citing Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1540 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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Although some courts and commentators have criticized Judge
Hand's test as "not [being] a test at all, 71 Judge Hand stated that it is
impossible to state an exact principle defining the line between merely
copying an idea (which is lawful)72 and when an imitator "has borrowed its
'expression."' 73 Therefore, "[d]ecisions must.., inevitably be ad hoc."74
4. Summary: A Filtering Mechanism
From the outset, this filtering mechanism mandates that a plaintiff
provide an actual link between his or her work and the defendant's work,
and ensures that the court will only engage in further substantive analysis if
"the material borrowed from the plaintiff [is] copyrightable.,
75
Furthermore, it is important to note that the actual copying and the
unlawful appropriation prongs are not distinct requirements; rather, actual
copying "is actually subsumed within. .. 'improper appropriation.' ' 76 The
actual copying prong, or derivation, could be "disposed of entirely [and]
one would arrive at the same result.,
77
B. The Ninth Circuit Approach
The Ninth Circuit's current standard was recited in a 2002 decision,
Metcalf v. Bochco.7 8 In that decision, authors of a screenplay for a
television show about an inner city hospital brought a copyright
infringement claim against competitors. 79  The plaintiffs had submitted
their idea and script for a movie to the defendants. 80 The defendants
rejected the plaintiffs' idea and script but produced a television series
dealing with very similar subjects. 8 1  These similarities included an
overburdened county hospital in inner city Los Angeles with mostly
African-American staff members. 82 Both works addressed issues dealing
71. Nash, 899 F.2d at 1540 (internal quotations omitted).
72. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 288.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 289.
78. Metcalf v. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2002).
79. See id. at 1071-72.
80. See id. at 1071.
81. See id.
82. See id.
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with poverty and urban afflictions.83 Both featured very similar characters
and developments in plot.
84
In order to prevail on their infringement claim, the court required the
plaintiffs to prove that (1) they owned the works in question, and (2) the
defendants copied them.85 Once the plaintiffs proved valid ownership of
copyright, the plaintiffs had to prove copying by showing that defendants
had access to the works in question.86 Once the plaintiffs proved access,
they had to prove unlawful copying by showing that the two works were
substantially similar with respect to protected elements.87
The Ninth Circuit held that the authors only owned the portions of the
screenplay they wrote. That is, they did not own those portions of the
screenplay that were written by writers hired by their corporation; those
portions constituted works for hire.88 The Metcalf court further held that
"the presence of so many generic similarities and the common patterns in
which they [arose]" raised a material question of fact as to whether the two
works were substantially similar. 89  Thus, summary judgment for the
authors was precluded.90
In both the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff must
prove ownership of a valid copyright. 9' However, the Ninth Circuit then
employs a different approach to analyze what constitutes unlawful
92copying. A plaintiff establishes unlawful copying by showing that (1) the
questioned works are "substantially similar in their protected elements" and
(2) the alleged infringer "'had access' to the copyrighted work., 9 3 Note
that the Ninth Circuit assesses the substantial similarity of two works under
an extrinsic-intrinsic test (discussed below) before evaluating the "degree
of access" a defendant had to the plaintiffs work.94 To determine whether
two works are substantially similar, the court will look at the "cumulative
83. See id. at 1073.
84. See Metcalf 294 F.3d at 1073-74.
85. See id. at 1072 (citing Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990)).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1072.
89. Id. at 1074.
90. Metcalf 294 F.3d at 1073-74 (explaining that the extrinsic test can raise a genuine issue
of material fact and therefore avoid summary judgment).
91. See Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 291-92.
92. See id. at 292.
93. Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Metcalf, 294 F.3d
at 1072).
94. See id. at 1178.
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weight of these similarities."
95
In Satava v. Lowry,96 the Ninth Circuit attempted to clarify its
position: "it is not true that any combination of unprotectable elements
automatically qualifies for copyright protection., 97 The Satava court held
that "a combination of unprotectable elements is eligible for copyright
protection only if those elements are numerous enough and their selection
and arrangement original enough that their combination constitutes an
original work of authorship. 9 8
"To determine whether two works are substantially similar," the
Ninth Circuit uses a "two-part analysis-an extrinsic test and an intrinsic
test."' 99
1. The Extrinsic Test
The "extrinsic" test objectively evaluates the "articulable similarities
between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and
sequence of events."' 0 0  Additionally, application of the extrinsic test
requires that the court "distinguish between the protectable and
unprotectable material because a party claiming infringement may place
'no reliance upon any similarity in expression resulting from unprotectable
elements."" 0 l
To determine the scope of copyright protection, the Ninth Circuit
emphasizes the "idea/expression dichotomy."'1 2 The Ninth Circuit has held
that "ideas generally do not receive protection, only the expression of such
ideas do."'' 0 3  The idea/expression dichotomy may be harder to define
"when the idea and expression are 'merged' or practically
indistinguishable."' 1 4  Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has held that
"'similarities derived from the use of common ideas cannot be protected;
95. Metcalf 294 F.3d at 1074.
96. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2003).
97. Id. at 811.
98. Id. (emphasis added); see also Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1074; Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv., 499
U.S. 340, 358 (1991) ("[T]he principal focus should be on whether the selection, coordination,
and arrangement are sufficiently original to merit protection.").
99. Rice, 330 F.3d at 1174 (citing Metcalf, 294 F.3d at 1073).
100. Id. (quoting Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir.
1994)).
101. Id. at 1174 (quoting Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1446).
102. See Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 302-03.
103. Rice, 330 F.3d at 1174.
104. Id.
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otherwise, the first to come up with an idea will comer the market." 10 5
2. The Intrinsic Test
Next, the Ninth Circuit moves to the subjective "intrinsic" test,
10 6
whereby the "ordinary observer" reviews the "overall similarity of the two
texts." 10 7 Under the intrinsic test, the Ninth Circuit-similar to the Second
Circuit-allows the accused party "who borrowed substantial protectable
expression to exculpate himself if the casual observer would not recognize
the accused text as having been derived from the plaintiffs text."'
08
3. Illustrative List of Limiting Doctrines
Several limiting doctrines are recognized by the Ninth Circuit: the
"merger" and related "scenes a faire" doctrines, 10 9 and the "independent
creation" defense. 0  Under the merger doctrine, courts have recognized
that some ideas are capable of intelligible expression in only one way."'
Thus, the expression under these circumstances is not protected because the
expression is thought to be inextricably merged with the idea.1 2 Under the
scenes a faire doctrine, "courts will not protect a copyrighted work from
infringement if the expression embodied in the work necessarily flows
from a commonplace idea."'" 13  Independent creation is an affirmative
defense in which "[a]ny evidence produced by the defendant which
explains or accounts to the satisfaction of the jury for such similarity or
105. Id. at 1175 (quoting Apple Computer, 35 F.3d at 1443).
106. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that, for summary judgment purposes, "only the
extrinsic test is important." Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th
Cir. 1994).
107. Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 293.
108. Id. at 294.
109. Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003).
110. See Bethea v. Burnett, No. CV04-7690, 2005 WL 1720631, at *15-16 (C.D. Cal. June
28, 2005) (holding that Mark Burnett committed no copyright violation when he "independently
created" "The Apprentice").
111. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2003).
112. See id.
113. Id.; see also Apple Computer, Inc., 35 F.3d at 1444 (stating that scenes a faire are
forms of expression which are "as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the
treatment of a given [idea]"); Rice v. Fox Broad. Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1053 (C.D. Cal.
2001) ("Though what may constitute scenes afaire will vary depending on the medium and the
subject matter of the particular copyrighted work at issue, the question is whether that particular
expression is so typical of the genre (e.g., a car chase in an action film) as to be
'indispensable."').
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identity, rebuts [the] presumption [of copying by the defendant]."" 4
C. Comparison Between the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit's
Copyright Infringement Standards
The critical difference between the Second Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit approaches to analyzing copyright infringement claims is "a
procedural distinction, with significant consequences."1 15
Facially, the Second Circuit's test differs from that of the Ninth
Circuit's in two ways. First, the Second Circuit allows a plaintiff to
indirectly prove unlawful copying under a "probative similarity" standard,
while the Ninth Circuit blends "derivation and copying copyrightable
material... into a single inquiry, 'substantial similarity."' '1 6 In addition,
the Second Circuit's substantial similarity inquiry has only one component,
whereas the Ninth Circuit's substantial similarity inquiry consists of two
parts-an objective and subjective test.'
1" 7
On the surface, the two legal standards have identical requirements:
"ownership, access, an analytical test..., and a subjective test."'" 8 Indeed,
"[t]he ownership and access requirements are not discernibly different,"
leaving the latter two requirements for further analysis.19
1. The Krofft Standard: Origin of the Different Approaches Taken by the
Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., the Ninth Circuit created the extrinsic test and the intrinsic test in
making its substantial similarity inquiry.' 20 The Krofft court created this
new approach "to restrict the scope of a plaintiffs copyright from
extending to (unprotectable) ideas."' 12 1 The following section will explore
whether the Krofft court met its stated objective.
114. Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir. 1976).
115. Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 294 (stating that both standards are substantively similar
while difference mostly relates to structure).




120. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
121. Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 302.
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i. Facts of the Case
In 1968, "the puppeteer team of Sid and Marty Krofft created the
world of H.R. Pufnstuf for NBC for use on its Saturday morning children's
television."'' 22 In the show, there were several costumed characters and a
boy named Jimmy, who lived in a fantasyland that was populated by
moving trees and talking books. 12 3 Because of the show's great success,
endorsements and a line of products soon followed.
24
Two years later, an advertising agency that was trying to secure a
contract with McDonald's approached Marty Krofft.1 25 The advertising
agency proposed to base McDonald's television advertisements on the H.R.
Pufnstuf characters.126 However, after a series of telephone conversations,
the advertising agency untruthfully informed Marty Krofft that
McDonald's had canceled the advertising campaign. 27  In fact, the
advertising agency had won the McDonald's contract and proceeded to
make the advertisements based on the H.R. Pufnstuf characters.
1 28
Additionally, the agency hired former Krofft employees to "design the sets
and used the same voice expert to create the characters' voices." 129 The
agency's advertising campaign was successful, resulting in the Kroffts' loss
of many licensing arrangements to the new McDonald's characters.
1 30
Based on the evidence presented, the plaintiffs won a verdict in a jury trial
and the defendants appealed. 1
31
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's judgment for
the plaintiffs. 132 Because the defendants admitted copying the idea of "a
fantasyland filled with diverse and fanciful characters" from the plaintiff's
television show,133 under the reformulated Arnstein test, the Ninth Circuit
Court only had to decide the question of substantial similarity of
expression. 134
122. Busek, supra note 8, at 1800.






129. Busek, supra note 8, at 1801.
130. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1175.
133. Id. at 1165.
134. See id. n.7 (clarifying that the court "formulate[d] an extrinsic-intrinsic test for
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The Krofft court held that the defendants unlawfully "copied the
plaintiff's own expression: characters with large heads and small bodies,
talking trees, and so on."'135 By its nature, the idea of a fantasy island can
be expressed in an infinite number of ways.1 36 Nonetheless, the defendants




According to the Krofft court, a determination made under the
extrinsic test depends on specific criteria, such as "the type of artwork
involved, the materials used, the subject matter, and the setting for the
subject."' 138 The intrinsic test attempts to establish whether two works are
substantially similar in their expression of ideas.' 39  In contrast to the
extrinsic test, the intrinsic test relies on the ordinary observer to measure
any similarities between the two works based on informal reviews.
40
As Professor Douglas Y'Barbo argued, "[i]t is not clear why one
needs an entire test (the extrinsic test) merely to determine similarity with
respect to (unprotectable) ideas."' 4' Further, since ideas are unprotected by
definition, the fact "that an accused infringer has copied ideas from the
plaintiff s work is irrelevant for purposes of determining infringement."1
42
The Krofft court began its analysis stating that infringement would be
established upon "proof of ownership, access, and substantial similarity.' 43
This is a misunderstanding of the test formulated by the Arnstein court.
144
In Arnstein, the court held that a plaintiff establishes copyright
infringement by proving the following: (1) ownership of a valid copyright;
(2) actual copying from the plaintiffs work by the accused party, which
must be shown by access and probative similarity; and (3) "unlawful
appropriation."'' 45  In contrast to Krofft, the Arnstein test used the term
infringement based on the idea-expression dichotomy").
135. Busek, supra note 8, at 1802 (citing Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1161).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 301.
142. Id. at 301-02 (emphasis added).
143. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162.
144. See Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 303.
145. See id.
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"unlawful appropriation" (or improper appropriation) instead of the term
"substantial similarity."'' 46  Also, the Arnstein test "never included
similarity with respect to unprotectable portions of the work at issue.' 47
Furthermore, the Krofft court's concern about overprotecting merely
ideas has been addressed in several subsequent Second Circuit Court
decisions that follow the Arnstein test. 148 For instance, in 1998, the Second
Circuit clarified that "'substantial similarity' requires that the copying [be]
quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to support the legal conclusion
that infringement (actionable copying) has occurred. The qualitative
component concerns the copying of expression, rather than ideas.' ' 149 Once
actual copying has been established, a plaintiff claiming infringement must
prove such copying was unlawful because the alleged infringer's work
shows "substantial similarity" to the plaintiffs protected expressions of
ideas. 50
2. Analytical Test: Second Circuit's Probative Similarity and Ninth
Circuit's Extrinsic Test
The Second Circuit's "probative similarity" test, along with the access
requirement, seeks to determine whether the accused infringer's text is
derived from the plaintiff's work.' 51 On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit's
objective analysis is part of the "substantial similarity" test. 52 The Ninth
Circuit attempts to determine whether "each element that appears in both
texts" is copyrightable. 53  In contrast, the Second Circuit's "probative
similarity" test only focuses on "identifying whether the accused text is
derived from the plaintiffs... [making] copyrightability... virtually
irrelevant."'
' 54
146. See id. at 304.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 305.
149. Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1998)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Ringgold v. Black Entm't Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir.
1997)).
150. Id. at 137 (citing Repp v. Webber, 132 F.3d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1997)).
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3. Ordinary Observer Test: The Second Circuit's Substantial
Similarity Test Versus the Ninth Circuit's Intrinsic Test
In the Second Circuit, the ordinary observer differentiates copying
from unlawful derivation (improper appropriation). 55  This subjective
inquiry does not occur unless and until the protectable elements have been
separated from unprotectable elements. 156 Such dissemination ensures that
only protectable elements similar to both works are then scrutinized by the
trier of fact to "determine whether the two are-according to the casual
observer-'substantially similar."' 157  In the Ninth Circuit's subjective
inquiry, the intrinsic test does not analyze both protectable as well as
unprotectable material.
158
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE: A CALL FOR A UNIFORM STANDARD
A. Why the Second Circuit's Legal Standard Is Better
In an age of frivolous lawsuits and overburdened judicial systems, the
Second Circuit's approach is more efficient at resolving many copyright
infringement disputes. 159  The Second Circuit has created a procedural
shortcut to its analysis by "dividing the 'unlawful copying' inquiry into
derivation [access plus probative similarity] and improper
appropriation. .... 160 This approach reduces the error rate.161
In essence, the Second Circuit's copyright infringement standard is
structured to avoid, where possible, the difficult determination of what the
law protects. 162 Before the trier of fact determines whether actual copying
of protected elements was improper, the parties "know that at least one
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 296.
158. See id. at 296-97.
159. See id. at 314 (claiming that the Second Circuit's approach "is also procedurally
superior since it allows the court to truncate the dispute if the plaintiff is unable to prove
derivation, and thus avoids becoming mired in the [unlawful appropriation] part of the test").
160. Id. at 298.
161. Id.
162. See Douglas Y'Barbo, The Heart of the Matter: The Property Right Conferred by
Copyright, 49 MERCER L. REV. 643, 643-44 (1998) ("'[C]opyright' is not an enforceable
property right In relation to a particular work of authorship or the expression embodied in
it .... [Rather,] it is a far more qualified property right In relation to a legally structured market
position.").
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element in the plaintiffs text is copyrightable (a presumption triggered by
proffering the copyright registration), and that the accused text was derived
from the plaintiffs text."'163 Only after the plaintiff has identified his or her
work as the source of the actual copying does the Second Circuit's test then
focus on whether a particular element is more than just an idea, and instead
a protectable expression.' 64 However, this approach tends to be a very
time-consuming and highly subjective (and therefore error-prone)
inquiry. 165
By contrast, the primary focus of the Ninth Circuit's copyright
infringement analysis is determining whether the copying of all elements in
its "totality of the similarities ... goes beyond the necessities of the...
theme and belies any claim of ... accident."'166 The Ninth Circuit's "total
concept and feel" test 167 is a subjective standard that determines "how the
intended audience would view the [two] works .. ,,168 This standard is
based on "the combination of many different elements which may
command copyright protection because of [the work's] particular
subjective quality. ... 169 Moreover, this test uses the subjective quality
aimed at the intended audience; for example, the children who may watch a
Saturday morning children's television show.' 
70
While the total concept and feel test has been applauded by some for
explicitly recognizing "from whose perspective such an inquiry should be
made,"' 71 many have criticized the test for undermining the crucial
distinction between merely ideas and the protected expression of ideas.
72
According to Nimmer's treatise on copyright, "for courts to advert to a
163. Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 299.
164. Id. at 300 (citing Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir.
1976).
165. Id.
166. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990).
167. See Busek, supra note 8, at 1790 (stating that the Ninth Circuit first introduced the
"total concept and feel" test in its 1970 decision in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429
F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970)).
168. See id.
169. See id. at 1790-91 (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1169 (9th Cir. 1977)).
170. See id. (infringement action of children's television show).
171. Michael L. Sharb, Getting a "Total Concept and Feel" of Copyright Infringement, 64
U. COLO. L. REv. 903, 915 (1993) (arguing that the "total concept and feel" test should be
uniformly adopted to determine substantial similarity).
172. See, e.g., Elliot M. Abramson, How Much Copying Under Copyright? Contradictions,
Paradoxes, Inconsistencies, 61 TEMPLE L. REv. 133, 148 (1988) ("Constructs such as 'total
concept and feel' . . . seem less germane when precise verbal description of similarity is
possible.").
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work's 'total concept' as the essence of its protectable character seems ill-
advised in the extreme."'
' 73
B. Why the Second Circuit's Infringement Standard Is Not Enough
Rather than introducing a new test, the solution lies in clarifying the
Second Circuit's approach to copyright infringement. Specifically, this
proposed solution adds a new filtering part to the analysis: separating those
works with a narrow range of protectable expression from other works with
a wider range before the subjective test is performed under the ordinary
observer test.
Under this proposal, a plaintiff alleging that a defendant infringed the
plaintiffs copyrighted work must prove several elements. First, the
plaintiff must prove ownership of a valid copyright. Second, the court
must conduct an objective analysis to distinguish between merely ideas and
protected expressions of ideas. This objective analysis seeks to prove
actual copying, which must be shown by access and similarity probative of
actual copying.
Next, this Comment proposes that courts should determine the range
of protectable expression in order to separate those works whose range is
narrow from those that are not. This separation is a procedural shortcut and
is designed to assist the trier of fact in its subjective analysis to determine
whether actual copying has crossed the line into unlawful or improper
appropriation. Hence, if the range of protectable expression is narrow, then
the court should require "virtual identity"'174 in order to prove
misappropriation. To illustrate what is meant by virtual identity, an
examination of the facts of the Satava case may be helpful. An artist
alleging that a competitor has infringed on the artist's "life-like glass-in-
glass sculptures of jellyfish"'175 should recognize that such a work
"possesses a thin copyright that protects against only virtually identical
copying.",176 The Satava court explained that "[n]ature gives us ideas of
animals in their natural surroundings .... The Satava court held that
since "[t]hese ideas [are] first expressed by nature . . . no artist may use
173.4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.03[A][1][c], at 13-46 (1997).
174. See Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994)).
175. Id. at 805.
176. Id. at 812 (citing Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 766 (9th Cir. 2003)).
177. Id. at 813.
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copyright law to prevent others from depicting them.' ' 178 Hence, virtual
identity, in such an instance, should mean that "[a]n artist may vary the
pose, attitude, gesture, muscle structure, facial expression, coat, or texture
of [an] animal ... [or] the background, lighting, or perspective."
179
On the other hand, if the range of protectable expression is wide, then
the court should allow the trier of fact to conduct the ordinary observer test
to decide whether the defendant's work is substantially similar to the
protectable elements of the plaintiffs work.
1. Narrow Range of Protectable Elements: "Virtual Identity" Test
In one instance, Robert Rice created a home video ("The Mystery
Magician") that revealed how to perform several well-known magic tricks
and illusions. 180 In 1986, Rice produced and registered the script for "The
Mystery Magician," then signed an agreement with International Creative
Management ("ICM") to commercially exploit his video. 181 ICM then
negotiated a ten-year exclusive video distribution contract with CBS/Fox
Video Westinghouse on Rice's behalf.182 At the end of the ten-year deal,
Rice entered into agreements with other entities and continued to distribute
"The Mystery Magician."' 183 Through the various distribution contracts,
Rice sold approximately 17,000 copies of the video worldwide between
1986 and 1999.184
At some point between 1995 and 1997, Fox Broadcasting Company
("Fox") began to develop a series of television specials ("Specials") about
magic. 185  Similar to "The Mystery Magician," the idea behind Fox's
programming was to reveal the secrets of famous magic tricks. 186 Between
November 1997 and October 1998, Fox aired the Specials four times and
encouraged viewers to purchase copies of the show using a toll-free










186. Rice, 330 F.3d at 1173.
187. Id.
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Rice thought that the individuals and entities associated with the
production of the Specials stole his expressions revealing the tricks behind
well-known illusions, prompting him to bring (among other claims) a
copyright infringement claim against Fox. 
188
In finding for the defendants, the court stated that "there are only a
discrete number of ways to express a magician revealing the secrets behind
magic tricks and illusions while disguising his identity."' 89 "[U]nder the
limiting doctrines of merger and scenes a faire, the mere fact that both
[video productions] feature a masked magician revealing magic tricks
cannot constitute copyright infringement."' 90 The court held that, although
there may arguably be similarities between the magicians' characters,
dialogues and settings, any similarity is too generic and thus constitutes
scenes a faire.191 These "generic and inconsequential" similarities merged
with the concept of showing secrets behind famous magic tricks.
192
In essence, by rejecting all of the plaintiffs arguments, the court
seemed to require near (or virtual) identity. Among the plaintiffs
arguments was that the defendant's work was substantially similar to his
work in plot and sequence of events.' 93 "Because disclosure of the secrets
behind magic tricks does not receive copyright protection, and the perform
and reveal sequence is also unprotectable," the court found "no substantial
similarity in plot and sequence of events between the two works.'
194
Compare the number of ways one can create an advertising
photograph of a blue vodka bottle. 195 "In 1993, photographer Joshua Ets-
Hokin took a series of photographs of Skyy's iconic blue vodka bottle for
188. See id. at 1174.
189. Id. at 1176 (emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. See id. at 1176-77.
192. Rice, 330 F.3d, at 1177.
193. Id.
194. Id. Note that the Ninth Circuit court in Rice mentioned that an objective analysis
revealed several notable differences. For example, the actual magic tricks and sequence of
revealing them in the two works were different; of the four installments of the defendant's
television broadcasts (Specials), only the first installment shares any tricks in common with the
plaintiffs work. Further examination shows that, of the eleven magic tricks shown in the
defendant's first installment, only five tricks are in common with the plaintiffs work (and even
these five common tricks are performed in a completely different sequence). Furthermore, the
Rice court noted that there are undisputable differences in the value of the production. The
Specials installments contain more special effects, consist of a larger cast, and are generally more
interesting. Id. at 1177 n.3.
195. See Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 323 F.3d 763, 764 (9th Cir. 2003).
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use in a marketing campaign."' 196  Subsequently, Skyy "hired two other
photographers to photograph the bottle and used these photographs in
advertising and other marketing materials."' 97 Three years later, Ets-Hokin
filed a copyright infringement action against Skyy claiming infringement of
his copyrights in the photographs.1
98
The Ets-Hokin court concluded that "[t]hough the Ets-Hokin and
Skyy photographs are indeed similar, their similarity is inevitable, given
the shared concept, or idea, of photographing the Skyy bottle."'
' 99
Therefore, the appellate court "affirm[ed] the district court's summary
judgment because the [defendant's] allegedly infringing photographs
[were] not 'virtually identical' ....,200 However, the Ets-Hokin court
stated that the higher "virtual identity" standard is only triggered when the
defendant asserts the affirmative defenses of merger and scenes afaire.
20 1
Copyright law has long recognized the concept of virtual identity,
also known as "substantial similarity. 2 °2 In Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp.,20 3 Judge Learned Hand remarked that "the less developed the
characters, the less they can be copyrighted. '' 204 The Ets-Hokin court was
quick to emphasize that the narrow range of protectable expression is
restrained by the idea of the photograph (e.g., the distinct blue Skyy vodka
bottle).20 5
A court should require a virtual identity standard if the range of
protectable elements is narrow regardless of whether or not the defendant
asserts the limiting doctrines of merger or scenes afaire.0 6 The rationale
behind this approach is two-fold: (1) to assist the trier of fact in the highly
subjective analysis of improper appropriation; and (2) to make efficient use
of all involved parties' time and efforts by making this procedural
distinction.
196. Id. at 765.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 766.
200. Id. at 764.
201. See Ets-Hokin, 323 F.3d at 764-65.
202. See id. at 764; Busek, supra note 8, at 1787.
203. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
204. Id. at 121.
205. See Ets-Hokin, 323 F.3d at 766.
206. See Apple Computer Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
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2. Wide Range of Protectable Elements: "Substantial Similarity" Test
The Krofft court noted that the ways in which the idea of a fantasy
island can be expressed are virtually limitless.20 7 Nonetheless, the
defendants "chose to cash in on the parts of the plaintiffs expression that
had already proven successful. 20 8  Using the "total concept and feel
test, '20 9 the Krofft court highlighted the point that although a large number
of expressions were available to them, the defendants unlawfully chose to
copy important portions of plaintiffs fantasy island idea.210
The 1990 case of Shaw v. Lindheim211 exemplifies another work with
a large number of possible variations in expression.212 Lou Shaw, a famous
television writer and producer, created a television pilot script called "The
Equalizer., 213 Shaw entered into an option contract with the defendant,
Richard Lindheim, an executive at the National Broadcasting Company
("NBC"), to produce the series.2 14 After Lindheim finished reading Shaw's
script, NBC chose not to produce the pilot, with "all rights in the script
revert[ing] back to Shaw.,,2 15  Lindheim later moved from NBC to
Universal Television, where he developed a script also entitled "The
Equalizer., 216  The pilot was broadcast on CBS, which to air "The
* 217Equalizer" series. In response, Shaw filed a claim against Lindheim for
copyright infringement.2 18
The Ninth Circuit in Shaw held that a reasonable trier of fact
supported finding sufficient similarity between the two scripts to deny the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 219 Further, as in the Krofft
case, the defendant had available to him a wide range of available
expressions he could have used.220 However, Lindheim used a similar title,
207. See Busek, supra note 8, at 1801-02.
208. Id. at 1802.
209. Id. at 1802 n.128.
210. See id. at 1802.
211. Shaw v. Lindheirn, 919 F.2d 1353, 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
212. Busek, supra note 8, at 1798.






219. See Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1363-64.
220. See id. at 1357-58.
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plot, theme, characters, and sequence of events. 22 1 Therefore, the Shaw
court held that Shaw had presented sufficient evidence to meet "the
extrinsic test for literary works and thus ha[d] presented a triable issue of
fact regarding substantial similarity of protected expression.'
222
Where the work in question has a wide range of protectable
expression, the court should require the lesser standard of substantial
similarity.223 If the objective analysis (actual copying proven by access and
probative similarity) has been correctly performed, the subjective analysis
under the substantial similarity standard makes sense given the "great
expressive freedom.
'2 24
C. Constitutional Callfor Protecting Expressions, Not Ideas
The proposed solution is not meant to "short-change the legitimate
need of creative artists to protect their original works. 225 Indeed, one of
the main purposes of copyright law is to "enrich[] our culture by giving
artists a financial incentive to create. 226  Equally important is the
competing principle that copyright law should not "cheat the public
domain" such that "other artists [can] make use of ideas that properly
belong to us all. 227
V. CONCLUSION
How should courts treat copyright cases with these competing
interests in mind? This Comment has been an attempt to answer this
question by advocating simplicity and efficiency. The Second Circuit's
approach to analyzing copyright infringement claims is preferable because
it offers manageable and procedurally useful tools. Substantively, the
Second Circuit's approach "allows the fact finder to stop and assess [actual
copying of protectable elements] separate from the far more tedious and
complicated task of determining whether what was borrowed qualifies for
protection by copyright., 228 Procedurally, this approach permits the court
to shorten the analysis where the plaintiff fails to prove that the accused
221. See id. at 1362-63.
222. Id. at 1363.
223. See Busek, supra note 8, at 1799-1800.
224. See id. at 1800.
225. Satava v. Lowry, 323 F.3d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 2003).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Y'Barbo, supra note 1, at 314.
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infringer actually copied protectable elements of the plaintiffs work.22 9
The additional filtration step proposed in this Comment-which
serves to separate works with a narrow range of protectable expression
from works whose range is wide-is designed to assist the trier of fact in
making its subjective determination of whether the actual copying of
protected elements constitutes unlawful appropriation. Ninth Circuit cases
such as Satava v. Lowry expressly recognize this concept.230 More courts
should make use of this underlying rationale in "vigorously policing the
line between idea and expression....,2 3 1
Claudia Hong*
229. See id.
230. See Satava, 323 F.3d at 813.
231. Id.
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